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AN  important  development in the methodology of policy evaluation 
research  in macroeconomics  is the growing  emphasis on the effects of 
policy systems-operating either  by institutional  arrangement  or formal 
policy rules-rather than  on the effects of one-time  changes  in the policy 
instruments.  For instance, many studies on monetary  policy in recent 
years have focused on the effect of a system in which the money supply 
systematically  responds  to the state of economic  activity;  previously  the 
focus was on the effect of a change in the money supply at a particular 
date. Recent examples of policy proposals  resulting  from such research 
include rules for the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates by a 
certain  amount  whenever the consumer  price index rises above a fixed 
target  or, alternatively,  rules to hold the growth  rate  of money constant 
except  for temporary  countercyclical  deviations  keyed to the unemploy- 
ment rate or to the growth rate of nominal  GNP.  i As these examples 
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illustrate,  proposals  emerging  from recent research  do not necessarily 
entail  fixed settings  for the policy instruments  as with earlier  proposals 
for  policy  rules  .2 Revived  interest  in  gold  or  general  commodity  standards 
also reflects  the recent emphasis  on policy systems. 
There are a number of reasons for this new emphasis. Increased 
attention  to expectations  has led to the need to specify future  as well as 
current  policy actions and hence to the specification  of policy rules.3 
The problem of time inconsistency and the closely related credibility 
issue have underlined  the advantages  of maintaining  policy rules even 
when there are short-term  advantages to their suspension.4 Finally, 
advances in the technical area of stochastic analysis of business cycle 
fluctuations  have made it feasible to study the systems effects of policy 
rules  on the behavior  of economic systems.5 
Much of this shifting emphasis, however, has been in the more 
theoretical  areas  of macroeconomic  research  and  as yet there  have been 
relatively  few empirical  evaluations  of alternative  policy systems. One 
reason, perhaps,  is the lack of historical  episodes in which an empirical 
study of a macroeconomic  policy rule is clear-cut.  It is unfortunate  that 
there  appear  to be few instances  with  a well-publicized  systematic  macro- 
economic policy rule  in operation  for a sufficiently  long time  for firms  or 
consumers  to become familiar  with how the rule  operates. 
The Swedish investment  funds system used for countercyclical  pur- 
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poses during  the 1950s  and 1960s  provides  a rare  opportunity  to study a 
policy rule  in operation.  Widely  publicized  and  consistently  operated  as 
a policy institution  to stabilize cyclical fluctuations  in business invest- 
ment by making  capital expenditures  cheaper during  recessions, it is 
ideal for an empirical investigation of the systems effect of policy. 
Moreover, as  a fiscal policy rule, the Swedish system permits an 
investigation  that complements  existing research  on monetary  systems 
and  that  can  potentially  provide  useful  information  about  the appropriate 
mix of monetary  and  fiscal policy rules. The main  objective  of this paper 
is to reexamine  the Swedish investment  funds system from  the perspec- 
tive of the new methodology  of policy evaluation  research. 
The analysis  proceeds  in four  stages. First, I describe  the institutional 
features  of the investment  funds  system  during  its countercyclical  period 
in the 1950s  and 1960s  and characterize  its operation  in a way suitable 
for quantitative  policy evaluation.  Second, I develop a model  of cyclical 
investment  behavior  oriented  toward  countercyclical  policy evaluation. 
The model emphasizes  investment  in structures,  the form  of investment 
at which much of the investment funds system was aimed, and uses 
heterogeneous  gestation  lags rather  than  adjustment  costs to account  for 
the lags in investment  spending.  The cyclical behavior  of investment  is 
characterized  by a distributed  lag accelerator  equation  in which the lag 
coefficients depend on the gestation periods and the investment  funds 
system. According to the model, the effect of the investment funds 
system would show up in the coefficients  of this accelerator  model: the 
system would shrink the coefficients and thereby alter the cyclical 
behavior of investment. Third, I look at the effects of the system 
empirically  by examining  reduced-form  accelerator  parameters  for man- 
ufacturing  investment  in Sweden. Finally, I calculate  the impact  of the 
system using numerical  parameter  values for the structural  investment 
model. 
The Swedish Investment Funds System 
Beginning  with new legislation  in 1955,  the Swedish  investment  funds 
system  was specifically  designed  as a countercyclical  stabilization  policy 
aimed  at reducing  fluctuations  in nonresidential  investment,  and was in 60  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
fact  used  actively  for  that  purpose  for  nearly  two decades  .6 The  explicitly 
announced  policy was that the funds system would as a rule "release 
funds" to firms for investment purposes during recession periods. 
Beginning  with the recession of 1958,  such a release actually  took place, 
confirming  the announced  policy. Subsequent  releases occurred  in 1962 
and 1967,  both  periods  of reduced  growth  or  declining  economic  activity. 
Funds were only released on a limited basis in certain geographical 
regions of Sweden in the recession of  1971, and it now appears the 
system had begun to lose its countercyclical characteristics  by then. 
Clearly  by 1975  the investment  funds system had become an essentially 
permanent  investment stimulus, with releases of funds regularly  ex- 
tended  each year, not merely  during  recessions. 
Because this paper focuses on the investment funds system as a 
stabilization  policy rather  than as a permanent  stimulus,  the analysis is 
limited  to the earlier  period  from  the mid-1950s  to the early 1970s,  when 
the system was well understood  by firms  and  the government  to operate 
countercyclically  and in reality operated  that way. At least during  this 
period it seems accurate to assume that firms' expectations about the 
investment  policy were rational  in the sense that they "knew the policy 
rule.  " 
ALLOCATION  AND  RELEASES  FROM  THE  INVESTMENT  FUNDS 
The investment  funds system is a component  of the general  corporate 
tax system in Sweden.7 Swedish corporations  pay a corporate  profits 
tax at both the local and the national  levels. The local tax rate varies by 
region but averaged about 20 percent in the 1960s.8  The national  rate 
6. An investment  funds system was first  enacted in 1938  in Sweden, but it was not 
effective as a countercyclical  device until 1955  when the provisions  (described  below) 
were enacted, requiring  firms  to deposit a fraction  of their  allocation  at the central  bank 
(Bank  of Sweden).  This provision  turned  the releases  into explicit  subsidies.  See Gunnar 
Eliasson, "Investment  Funds in Operation,"  Occasional  Paper  2 (Stockholm:  National 
Institute  of Economic  Research, 1955),  pp. 9-10. 
7.  Useful references  on the investment  funds system include  Eliasson, "Investment 
Funds"; Assar Lindbeck, Swedish Economic Policy (University of California  Press, 
Berkeley, 1974);  Villy Bergstrom,  "Studies  in Swedish  Post-War  Industrial  Investments" 
(Ph.D. Dissertation,  Uppsala University, 1981);  Thomas Lindberg  and Jan Sodersten, 
Taxation of Income from  Capital: An International  Tax Comparison,  unpublished (Na- 
tional  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 1981),  chap.  7. 
8. Martin  Norr, Claes Sandels,  and  Nils G. Hornhammar,  The  Tax  System  in Sweden 
(Stockholm:  Stockholms  Enskilda  Bank, 1969),  p. 16. John B.  Taylor  61 
Table  1.  Variables  Affecting  Investment  Incentives  in Nonresidential  Structures, 
Sweden,  1955-72a 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Present  Fr-action  Effective 
value of  of time  discount 
tax  that  on in- 
Statutoty  Effective  Interest  deprecia-  funds  are  vestment 
tax rate,  tax rate,  rate,  tion,  released,  expen- 
Year  tS  t,  r  x  w  dituresb 
1955  52  47  4.6  42  0.00  20 
1956  56  50  4.7  41  0.00  21 
1957  56  50  5.1  39  0.00  20 
1958  57  50  5.1  39  0.67  37 
1959  57  50  5.2  39  0.75  39 
1960  49  45  6.0  35  0.00  16 
1961  49  48  6.0  35  0.00  17 
1962  49  48  5.5  38  0.50  35 
1963  49  48  5.0  40  0.33  30 
1964  50  48  6.1  35  0.00  17 
1965  51  49  6.4  34  0.00  17 
1966  51  49  6.8  33  0.00  16 
1967  51  49  6.2  35  0.67  40 
1968  52  50  6.5  34  0.50  34 
1969  52  50  7.2  31  0.25  24 
1970  53  50  7.5  31  0.00  15 
1971  54  51  7.5  31  0.00  16 
1972  54  51  7.4  31  0.00  16 
Sources:  The variables  t,,  tb,  r, and 8  were  provided  by Villy  Bergstrom as part of the data set used  to compute 
capital costs  in his "Studies  in Swedish  Post-War Industrial Investments"  (Ph.D.  dissertation,  Uppsala  University, 
1981). The fraction,  w, was computed  from release  dates  reported in the  OECD Economic  Surveys:  Sweden  (Paris: 
OECD,  April  1963), p.  20, and (Paris: OECD,  March  1969), p.  28; and in Gunnar Eliasson,  "Investment  Funds  in 
Operation,"  Occasional  Paper 2 (Stockholm:  National  Institute of Economic  Research,  1955), p. 31. 
a.  The  statutory tax rate is an average  of the national and local  tax rates on corporate  profits. The effective  tax 
rate is given by t,  =  0.6t,  +  0.4tb,  where  tb is the percent of investment  fund allocations  that must be deposited  at 
the central bank (tb  =  0.40 from  1955 through  1960 and 0.46 from  1961 through  1972). The interest rate is the yield 
on long-term industrial bonds.  The present  value of tax depreciation  as a percent of investment  is approximated  by 
x  =  S/(S +  r), where  r is the interest  rate and S  =  3.3 percent,  an estimate  of tax depreciation  on  nonresidential 
structures.  The  fraction  of  the  year,  iv, that the  investment  funds  were  released  is  given  by  the  total  number of 
months during which funds were released divided by twelve.  (The release in 1971-72 was assumed to be too restricted 
to affect investments  at the margin.) 
b.  The formula for the discount on new investment  expenditures  is (I  -  w)xtI  ?  w(tb  +  0.1t,).  This is a weighted 
average of the present value of the tax savings  due to depreciation,  xte,  and the investment  subsidy  available when 
funds  are  released  (tb  +  0. 1t),  the  latter  reflecting  the  10 percent  investment  deduction  on  release-financed 
expenditures. 
was 40 percent. In Sweden local income taxes are deductible  from the 
national  tax; hence the total statutory  profits  tax rate on corporations 
averaged  about  52 percent  during  the period  of study. Annual  values are 
shown  in table 1. 
Tax deductions from profits for depreciation on fixed capital are 
generally  accelerated relative to economic depreciation  (ignoring  the 62  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
effects of inflation  on replacement  costs), but the acceleration  is signifi- 
cantly  greater  for equipment  than  for buildings.  The tax depreciation  for 
equipment  is 30 percent a year on a declining  balance basis, while the 
depreciation  for buildings  is approximately  4.5 percent  a year. Economic 
depreciation  is approximately  7.7 percent  and  2.6 percent  for equipment 
and  buildings  used in manufacturing,  respectively.9 
The investment funds system permits  firms  to deduct an amount  in 
addition  to depreciation  from profits  before computing  tax. During  the 
1950s  and 1960s  when the investment  funds system operated counter- 
cyclically, firms  could deduct (in good times and bad) up to 40 percent 
of their  profits  before tax by "allocating"  this amount  to an investment 
fund. However, 46 percent of this deduction (40 percent before 1961) 
had to be deposited interest free at the central bank. This allocation 
provides  no direct  inducements  for current  investment  because the firm 
is free to use the additional  after-tax  profits  generated  by the deduction 
less the deposit  at the central  bank  for any  purpose.  Since the tax savings 
is not contingent  on the firm's  behavior  in any way, it is best viewed as 
an attractive alternative  (even if the firms could never use the funds 
again)  to paying  the profits  tax: 46 percent "tax" is paid to the central 
bank  rather  than  52  percent  to the local and  national  governments.  Hence 
firms would use the investment funds allocation up to the limit of 40 
percent, and the tax rate on corporations  is effectively reduced  from 52 
percent to (0.4)(46) +  (0.6)(52) =  49.6 percent, even if the funds are 
never used again. In general, the effective tax rate assuming  the funds 
are not used later  for investment  is given by te -  0.6t, +  0.4tb,  where te 
is the effective rate, ts is the statutory  rate, and tb  is the amount  paid to 
the central  bank.  Note that  tb  = 0.4 from 1955  to 1960  and  0.46 from 1961 
to 1975. 
The part  of the investment  funds system that is related  to the timing 
of investment  comes in the "release  offunds" procedure.  During  periods 
of recession, firms  were permitted  to withdraw  funds (tax free) from  the 
central  bank allocation up to 46 percent of their investment  purchases 
(40 percent before 1961). In addition, firms using the funds would be 
permitted  a tax deduction of 10 percent of the value of the investment 
expenditure.  However, firms  could  not also deduct  depreciation  for such 
9.  See  Lindberg and Sodersten,  Taxation of Income from  Capital.  For equipment, 
firms  can switch to straight-line  depreciation  when it becomes profitable  to do so. The 
figure  for buildings  is an approximation  of straight-line  rules. John B.  Taylor  63 
investments. The release of funds can therefore be interpreted  as a 
change in the effective price of investment goods. During periods of 
release the price paid by the firms  would be reduced  by the 46 percent 
subsidy and the tax deduction and would be increased by tax savings 
forgone by not using the depreciation  allowance. The net effect was 
usually  a reduction  in the effective price paid.  '0 
It is important  to distinguish  between the allocation  and the release 
of funds  from  the investment  funds system when determining  its effects 
on investments. The allocation  of profits  to the funds is equivalent  to a 
reduction  in the tax rate on corporate  capital, which is unrelated  to the 
timing  and  level of investment,  but which influences  the desired  level of 
capital  in the corporate sector in the long run. On the other hand, the 
release of funds that reduces the price  paid  for investment  goods during 
the period  of release, but not at other times, will influence  the timing  of 
investment expenditures as firms attempt to take advantage of the 
discount on investment goods during the release periods. Only this 
second part  of the investment  funds system is relevant  for the purposes 
of investigating  its countercyclical  effects. 
EFFECTS  ON  THE  PRICE  PAID  FOR  INVESTMENT  GOODS 
Because of the loss of tax depreciation  when the funds are used, the 
extent  of the effective price  reduction  depends  on the type of investment 
10. The upper  limit  on the use of the investment  funds during  a release period  is the 
total  amount  of funds  that  the firm  set aside but  did not previously  withdraw  from  its own 
allocation.  This limit is a function  of the past profitability  of the firm,  which previously 
determined  how much  it paid  to the central  bank.  Clearly  the  impact  of the system  depends 
on the proportion  of firms  that  are  over their  limits. 
Lindberg  and Sodersten  assume that firms  are over their limits when the system is 
permanently  releasing  funds. They cite survey evidence supporting  this assumption  and 
hence  treat  the releases as a general  reduction  of the profits  tax unrelated  to the timing  of 
investment  behavior.  I assume  that  at least a significant  fraction  of firms  are  not over their 
limits  when  the system  is used for cyclical  purposes  only. 
The  effective  rate,  te, should  also  be reduced  by the  (unconditional)  expected  discounted 
value  of the tax savings  from  future  releases  of funds.  For  example,  if the funds  are  always 
expected  to be released  in T years, the effective  tax rate  is 
0.6t,  +  0.4tb  LI  + .)TI  +  0.4D  +  )T 
where  r is the discount  rate and  D is the present  value of lost tax depreciation  starting  T 
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expenditure  and the tax laws for depreciation  purposes. Moreover, it 
depends  on the discount  rate used to capitalize  the depreciation  deduc- 
tions. Using the depreciation rates of 30 and 4.5 percent a year for 
machinery  and  buildings  and  a discount  rate  of 6 percent  implies  that  the 
present  value of the lost depreciation  is 83 and  43 percent, respectively, 
for  these two types of investment.  "  I  At an  effective tax rate  of 50  percent, 
these values  indicate  capitalized  tax losses of 41.5 percent  for machinery 
and 21.5 percent for buildings. The subsidy for using the funds is 46 
percent plus the effective tax rate multiplied  by the investment tax 
deduction  of 10 percent. That is, 46 +  (0.50)(10) =  51 percent. Hence 
the net reduction  in the price of investment goods is 51 -  41.5 =  9.5 
percent for machinery, and 51 -  21.5 =  29.5 percent for plants and 
buildings.  If the discount rate is 3 percent, the net reduction  in price is 
5.5 percent  and 16.4  percent  for machinery  and buildings,  respectively. 
The price reductions  are thus considerably  larger  for structures  than 
for equipment  investment. In fact, the calculations  for equipment  in- 
vestment  overstate  the reduction  because  the Swedish  depreciation  rules 
permit  firms  to switch to a straight-line  depreciation  from the declining 
balance method when it becomes favorable  to do so. By contrast, the 
effect of the system on the cost of construction  goods is likely to be 
understated  by these calculations. According  to Swedish depreciation 
rules during  this period, depreciation  on buildings  and plants cannot 
begin until the project  is completed, while the investment  funds can be 
used as soon as "the value is put in place." For construction  projects 
with long gestation periods this would reduce the present value of the 
depreciation  significantly.  In fact, it appears  that the investment  funds 
were used largely  for building  projects during  the period  under  investi- 
gation.'2  For this reason, the quantitative  evaluation  that follows con- 
centrates  on construction  investment. 
11. Using  exponential  depreciation  at rate  8 and  a discount  rate  of r percent  a year, the 
capitalized  value  of the lost depreciation  is given  by 8/(8 + r). 
12. According  to Norr, Sandels,  and  Hornhammar,  "Most  of the projects  involved  the 
construction  of buildings  and plants, since the liberal  rules governing  the valuation  of 
inventory  and the depreciation  of machinery  provide  little incentive  to charge  inventory 
or  machinery  acquisitions  to an  investment  reserve.  " See their  The  Tax  System  in Sweden, 
p.  41. Eliasson'  s survey  study  indicates  that  the  effect  of the 1962-63  release  on  construction 
was five times the effect on equipment.  See his "Investment  Funds," p. 107. The first 
release  in 1958  was directed  entirely  toward  construction. John B.  Taylor  65 
ADDITIONAL  INVESTMENT  INCENTIVES  IN  SWEDEN 
There are a number  of additional  aspects of the system to keep in 
mind  when evaluating  its effects. In addition  to a general  countercyclical 
release of funds, money can be withdrawn  from the system in several 
other  ways. After  a five-year  period,  for example,  30  percent  of the funds 
can be withdrawn.  This is called the free sector of the funds. There  have 
also been special releases of funds  for investment  in particular  projects, 
industries,  or regions. Moreover, in some instances, inventory invest- 
ment has been financed by the investment funds system. These other 
categories of withdrawals  appear  to be minor compared  with releases 
for fixed investment, at least during  the countercyclical  period of the 
system, and their impact has not been included  in this study. It should 
be noted, however, that data on funds withdrawals  include amounts 
withdrawn  through  these other provisions  and hence do not equal zero 
during  "nonrelease"  periods. 
A number  of other investment incentives have been in operation  in 
Sweden that may have had countercyclical effects. For example, in- 
vestment  taxes were used to reduce investment  demand  in 1952-53  and 
1955-57,  but these were not used during  the rest of the period  in which 
the investment funds system was used countercyclically. Monetary 
policy may also have had  a countercyclical  influence.  To the extent that 
other  investment  effects do operate  countercyclically,  and  are expected 
to operate  this way, they will influence  the interpretation  of the impact 
of the investment  funds system. It turns  out, however, that  the counter- 
cyclical behavior  of the investment  funds system dominated  these other 
influences on investment during the period, at least in the case of 
investment  in structures. 
Table 1 presents a tabulation  of the main variables that influence 
decisions to invest in nonresidential  structures.  The movement in the 
effective tax rate on corporations  is very small, and the interest rate, 
and consequently the present value of depreciation,  have a relatively 
smooth trend with only minor cyclical movements. But the effective 
discount on investment expenditures, computed as described above 
(taking  into account  the fraction  of the year that  funds  are released),  has 
large fluctuations. It is clear from table 1 that the major reason for 
cyclical variation in these measures of investment incentives is the 66  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
investment  funds system. As a working  hypothesis, it is not unrealistic 
to assume that all the cyclical variability  in investment incentives in 
structures  occurred  because of the investment  funds  in this period. 
Figure 1 shows the price discount variable  during  the period along 
with the growth rate of real GDP. It is apparent  from the figure that 
policy-induced  shifts in the price of investment goods were generally 
related to cyclical fluctuations. In the 1957-58 and 1966-67 periods, 
however, it appears  that the release may have lasted too long, and the 
movements  in the 1962-63  recession appear  large  relative  to the decline 
in growth at that time. Note also that the annual  averages in the figure 
tend to smooth  the fluctuations  in the price. 
As is shown in the theoretical development that follows, it is the 
expected  change  in the price  of investment  that  is relevant  for  investment 
decisions:  an expected increase  in the price stimulates  purchases  today. 
If the movements  in figure  1 were perfectly  anticipated  by firms,  a large 
disincentive to invest would occur  just before the price falls, which is 
just when the recessions are starting;  conversely, there  would  be a large 
incentive to invest just before the price rises, which is when the next 
boom has begun. Clearly  these price changes would be destabilizing  if 
they were perfectly  foreseen, and  any stabilizing  influence  of the system 
must occur because firms  are not able to forecast the price movements 
perfectly. Alternative  forecasting  rules are considered  when I examine 
these stabilization  issues below. 
INSTITUTIONAL  DISCRETION  IN  FOLLOWING  THE  RULE 
To understand  the institutional  aspects  of the  investment  funds  system 
it is useful to study the chronology  of a typical  release of funds  from  the 
system. When  the 1962-63  release  was activated,  for example,  the Labor 
Market  Board, an agency of the central government,  was responsible 
for monitoring  the state of the economy and  determining  when a release 
of funds was appropriate.  In early 1962, when the usual signals of 
recession were appearing, the Labor Market Board contacted firms 
holding  investment  funds  to tell them  that  a release in the near-term  was 
likely. On  May 11, 1962,  the release of funds  for investment  in construc- 
tion was announced.  To use the funds the firms  had to start  the projects 
before November 1, 1962, and only expenditures  on work performed 
and  materials  purchased  during  the interval  from July 1, 1962,  through John B.  Taylor  67 
Figure 1.  Cyclical Effects of the Investment  Funds System on the Price of 
Investment  in Structures, 1956-72 
Effective price (percent of actual price paid)  Growth rate of GDP (percent) 
100  8 
Growth rate of real GDP 
90  6  6 
r 
Source:  See tables I and B-  1. 
April 30, 1963, could be subsidized by investment funds. (Later in 1962 
there was  a similar release  of funds for investment  in machinery  and 
equipment).  There  was  evidently  open  discussion  near  the  original 
announcement date concerning an extension  of the release,  at least for 
those firms that had not used up their account, if the recession  continued 
beyond April 1963. In fact, this extension did not occur since the economy 
was already into a strong recovery by that time.- 
The  1962-63  release  is typical  because  conditions  for a release  of 68  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
funds were not determined  by a mechanical  formula  or trigger  mecha- 
nism. Government  officials  were left with some discretion  to determine 
when a recession had begun. Nevertheless, the responsibilities  of the 
government  officials  were stipulated  with sufficient  precision  that their 
behavior  during  most of the countercyclical  phase of the system could 
accurately  be characterized  as a policy rule, despite this discretion.'3 
A Model of Cyclical Investment Fluctuations 
This section develops a formal  quantitative  model for the evaluation 
of countercyclical  investment  stabilizers.  Although  the model  is general 
enough  to be applicable  in other situations,  the actual operation  of the 
investment funds during the late 1950s and 1960s has influenced the 
choice of its major  features  in a number  of ways. Before describing  the 
model in detail, it will be useful to summarize  these features  and relate 
them  to the investment  funds system. 
OVERVIEW 
Because the primary  objective of the investment funds during  this 
period  was to stabilize  cyclical fluctuations  in investments,  it is essential 
to have a mechanism  generating  such fluctuations  in order  to evaluate 
the effect of the funds. Such  fluctuations  in investment  are  assumed  here 
to be caused by exogenous fluctuations  in the demand  for an individual 
firm's products. These demand  fluctuations  give rise to "accelerator- 
type" behavioral  equations  for investment  in which the level of invest- 
ment is a distributed  lag function  of the changes in exogenous demand. 
As demand  growth  accelerates and decelerates  over the cycle, it gener- 
ates fluctuations  in investment. Econometric studies have shown that 
fluctuations  in demand explain a large fraction of the fluctuation  in 
investment  so that potentially  the model of investment  behavior  will be 
13. The phasing  out of the countercyclical  features  of the system was probably  made 
easier by these discretionary  features. If a trigger  formula had been legislated, this 
conversion  of the system to a permanent  investment  stimulus  might have come more 
slowly, but the general  consensus  developing  in the 1970s  that  long-run  capital  formation 
dominated  countercyclical  goals would  have made  even a legislated  change  likely. John B.  Taylor  69 
able to capture this cyclical regularity  empirically.14 Except for the 
influence  of the investment stabilizers,  fluctuations  occur in the model 
solely because of fluctuations  in demand.  In this sense the model is one 
of short-term  fluctuations  rather  than long-term  growth. Although  the 
cyclical fluctuations  in demand are taken to be exogenous, firms will 
attempt to forecast them when deciding how much to invest for the 
future. 
A second characteristic  of the model is its orientation  toward  invest- 
ment in structures rather than equipment investment. As described 
above, the investment funds had their primary effect on structures 
investment.  The investment  theory used here emphasizes  the relatively 
long  gestation  period  for structures  and  the fact that  actual  value-put-in- 
place is distributed  over time according  to relatively  rigid  technological 
constraints.  In the recent investment  literature  such gestation theories 
have  been  offered  as an  alternative  to the  more  typical  cost-of-adjustment 
theories.  1  Both types of theories have been motivated by empirical 
considerations  and  in particular  by the fact that  actual  investment  series 
are smoother than what would be implied by reasonable  estimates of 
changes in the desired capital stock. The cost-of-adjustment  models 
achieve the smoothing  by assuming  a convex cost of adjusting  capital. 
The smoothing  occurs naturally  in the gestation  theories  because only a 
fixed  fraction  of the desired  change  in capital  is put in place each period. 
The gestation theories are clearly empirically  relevant  for investments 
in structures,  and  perhaps  for investment  in many  types of machinery  as 
14.  See Peter K. Clark, "Investment  in the 1970s: Theory, Performance, and Predic- 
tion," BPEA, 1:1979, pp. 73-113 for evidence  of this in the United States. 
15.  Recent studies using the gestation approach include Finn E. Kydland and Edward 
C. Prescott,  "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,"  Working Paper 28 (Carnegie- 
Mellon  University  and University  of  Minnesota,  September  1981), and "Rules  Rather 
Than Discretion";  and Robert E. Hall, "The Macroeconomic  Impact of Changes in Income 
Taxes in the Short and Medium Runs," Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 86, pt. 2 (April 
1978), pp.  S71-S85.  A  much earlier reference  to this type  of investment  theory  is  M. 
Kalecki,  "A  Macrodynamic  Theory  of  Business  Cycles,"  Econometrica,  vol.  3 (July 
1935), pp. 327-44; the Kalecki model is also described in R. G. D. Allen, Macro-Economic 
Theory:A Mathematical  Treatment (MacMillan, 1968), pp. 369-72. The cost of adjustment 
model has been  used  much more extensively  in recent  years.  For some  examples  with 
references  to earlier work,  see  Thomas J. Sargent, Macroeconomic  Theoty (Academic 
Press,  1979),  Fumio  Hayashi,  "Tobin's  Marginal q  and  Average  q:  A  Neoclassical 
Interpretation,"  Econometrica,  vol.  50 (January 1982), pp.  213-24;  and Lawrence  H. 
Summers, "Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory Approach,"  BPEA, 1:1981, 
pp. 67-127. 70  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
well. One  advantage  of the  gestation  approach  when  applied  to structures 
investment  is that it is possible to use microeconomic  survey data on 
construction  periods  for different  types of capital  as a constraint  on the 
aggregate  lag distributions  in the investment equations. Because there 
is no explicit accounting interpretation  of the "costs" in the cost of 
adjustment  model, this extra information  is not available. Moreover, 
one must rely solely on econometric estimates of the lag distributions 
when using  that  approach. 
A third  characteristic  of the model is the heterogeneity  of investment 
due to differences in the completion times for various types of capital 
projects. Such heterogeneity is realistic because in the real world all 
investment  projects  do not take the same time to complete. The model 
emphasizes this heterogeneity for two reasons. First, heterogeneity 
alters  the interpretation  of the investment  function  in a way that  appears 
to be  empirically significant. The lag distribution of the aggregate 
investment  function depends on the proportion  of the various types of 
capital in the total capital stock. If this heterogeneity  is ignored  when 
evaluating  the effect of policy, significant  errors  can be made. Second, 
one would like to be able to estimate how an investment stabilization 
policy altered  the choice of firms'  investment  projects,  and, in  particular, 
whether it caused shifts to shorter projects. In fact, there is  some 
evidence that the investment funds had such a "cost-shifting" effect 
whereby firms  adjusted  their investment  policies toward  projects with 
shorter  construction  periods.  16 This is in addition  to the "time shifting" 
effect, whereby  investment  activity  is shifted  from  one period  to another: 
forward  because of an anticipated  release of funds  or backward  because 
of the anticipation  that the release would stop after  a specific  period. 
The description  of the model begins with the simplest case in which 
there  is only one type of capital  that  takes a single  period  to build.  It then 
goes on to consider two-period  and more generally n-period  projects, 
and  finally  the aggregation  of projects  of different  lengths. 
SINGLE-PERIOD  PROJECTS 
Assume that a typical firm minimizes the expected value of the 
following  cost function: 
16.  The survey of firms in Eliasson's  study gives some evidence  of this. See especially 
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(1)  fEl  b L  (vY, -  K,)2  +  c,I, 
where 
b  =  discount factor 
Y, =  exogenously given demand  for the firm's  products 
K,  =  capital  stock of the firm  at the start  of period  t 
I,  =  investment  during period t 
v  =  desired  capital-output  ratio 
c,  =  cost of investment  goods during  period  t. 
Capital  depreciates  at rate h. Projects  started  at the beginning  of period 
t are added  to the capital  stock when they are completed  at the end of t 
in the single-period  model. Let S, be projects  started  in period  t. Then 
(2)  K,?1 = Kt + St -  hKt. 
In the case in which all the value of the project  is put in place during  one 
period,  then 
(3)  It =  St. 
The quadratic  term in the cost function  can be interpreted  in a number 
of ways. In general it simply represents the U-shaped cost of having 
either too little or too much capital relative to demand, given the 
production  function  and  the relative  price  of capital  versus other  factors 
of production.  Because only temporary  changes are considered  here in 
the relative  cost of investment  goods, c,  that  occur through  investment 
stabilization  policies, it is assumed  that the desired  capital-output  ratio, 
v, is constant. The main reason for fluctuations  in the desired level of 
capital  will come through  fluctuations  in Y,  as described  below. 
Since this paper  is concerned  with cyclical variations  in investment, 
the variables  in equations 1 through  3 should  be thought  of as deviations 
from  a long-run  secular  growth  trend.  These deviations,  with zero mean, 
are measures of cyclical variations  in investment, output, and capital 
costs. The econometric  analysis that follows considers empirical  coun- 
terparts  to these detrended  cyclical variables. 
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with  respect  to K, after  substitution  for  I, in 1  using  2 and  3.17 This results 
in 
ct-  b(1  -hCt  (4)  It =  v  Y,  +1  (I  -  h)Kt_C  bdl-hC+ 
where the hat over a variable indicates its forecast during  the period 
after the  project is  started. Recall  that  K,  is  predetermined at 
time  t. Equation  4 simply  shows that  investment  is an  increasing  function 
of expected sales in the next period and a decreasing  function of the 
quasi  first  difference  in cost of investment  goods. Note that  if the cost of 
investment goods is expected to fall in the future, investment will be 
reduced today as firms  attempt  to postpone their investment projects. 
The potential  for this to be destabilizing  is discussed below. 
To eliminate  the expectations  variable  in 4 one must  specify  how firms 
forecast demand conditions in their own markets. Here it is assumed 
that  firms  forecast according  to the simple  autoregressive  model, 
(5)  Yt+i=aiY, 
where 0 ?  a ?  1. Because demand  fluctuations  are interpreted  here as 
deviations  from  trend,  the long-run  average  value  of Y,  is zero. According 
to 5, when demand  conditions are above normal,  firms  expect them to 
return  to normal  gradually  over time. A similar  return  to normal  condi- 
tions is expected in bad times. One property  missing  from  5, which may 
seem serious from a business cycle perspective, is forecasts of turning 
points or even of transitions  from  boom times to recessions. Equation  5 
implies that cyclical fluctuations  in demand come from a simple first- 
order  autoregressive  process, Y, = a Y,_1 +  u,. An alternative  would be 
to use a higher-order  process such as Y,  =  Y,_- +  U2y,-2  +  u,, which 
is sometimes thought  to be characteristic  of business cycles. The case 
in which  firms  forecast output  using  a second-order  process is described 
below to illustrate  the potential  for an investment  policy to be destabi- 
lizing. 
As described in the previous section, the investment funds system 
can be interpreted  as reducing  the effective price of investment  expen- 
ditures (value put in place) during  recessions. The price will be higher 
during  booms and lower during  recessions relative  to the average  price 
17. See appendix  A for a derivation. John B.  Taylor  73 
over an entire  business cycle fluctuation.  The extent to which  this is true 
empirically  is indicated  in table 1 and figure 1. An algebraic  policy rule 
approximating  the investment  funds system is therefore  written  as 
(6)  c, =  gYp, 
where g  is a positive policy parameter. As  demand fluctuates, the 
effective price of investment goods fluctuates in the same direction. 
Note that 6 implies that the investment  funds system affects the price 
with more continuity  than it does in reality. In fact, the funds are either 
in a state of release or not. However, as table 1 indicates, the use of 
annual  averages effectively smooths the price series. As the empirical 
analysis focuses on annual  data, 6 may serve as a reasonable  approxi- 
mation. An alternative  approach  would be to approximate  the system 
with  a two-state  switching  model, but  this  would  significantly  complicate 
the analysis. Moreover, even if a switching  rule were a more accurate 
description  of the system, firms' forecasts of the cost, c,  would be a 
relatively smooth function of the state of demand as they forecast 
whether the government would release funds. That is, the lower the 
forecast  of demand,  the greater  the probability  that  the release  will occur 
and lower the price. The use of 6 is then accurate for an appropriate 
probability  model of the government's  action. In actuality, except for 
very short  periods, there  always appeared  to be some uncertainty  about 
when a release would occur and  whether  it would be extended. 
Returning  now to the problem  of deriving  investment  decisions of the 
firm,  substitute  6 and the forecasting  rule 5 into 4 to obtain 
(7)  I,=  va -  db(I  -  ab(1 -  h))  Y, -  (I -  h)K,. 
If one takes first  differences  and uses 2 and 3, the result  is 
(8)  It = Alz,  +  hK,, 
where 
z,=  Y,-Y,-1  and  A1=  va--9(1-ab(1--h)). 
db 
Equation  8 expresses gross  investment  as the sum.of  two components: 
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depreciates  between periods, and Alz,, or net investment. The latter is 
determined by a linear accelerator mechanism, with an accelerator 
coefficient, Al, that depends positively on the desired capital-output 
ratio, v, and negatively on the depreciation rate, h (because faster 
depreciation  makes it more expensive to maintain  a capital  stock of any 
given size). 
The accelerator coefficient also depends on the investment funds 
policy as reflected in the parameter  g. It can be seen from 8 that the 
introduction  of an investment  stabilization  policy reduces  the size of the 
accelerator  (because ab(1 -  h) <  1), and that if g can be set accurately 
by policymakers,  the optimal  value from the point of view of reducing 
fluctuations  in investment  is g  =  dvabl(1  -  ab(1 -  h)). The optimal 
policy parameter  is an increasing  function  of the capital-output  ratio,  the 
persistence  of demand  fluctuations,  and  the discount  factor. 
It is clear from 8 how an investment stabilizer  affects the timing  of 
investment. In boom periods when output is rising, investment  will be 
less than  it would  be without  the stabilizer,  and  in recessions investment 
is more  than  it would  otherwise  be. Hence the stabilizer  shifts  investment 
from  recovery  periods  to recessions and  in this sense would  be expected 
to smooth  cyclical swings  in investment.  The average  level of investment 
over an entire  cycle is not changed  by the policy. 
TWO-PERIOD  PROJECTS 
The introduction  of capital with longer gestation periods does not 
change the objective function of the firm, but it does alter the timing 
between starts and capital accumulation  as well as between starts and 
value put in place. When the gestation time is two periods, equation  2 
becomes 
(9)  K+2=  (1 -  h)Kt+I +  St, 
so that a construction  project that begins today augments the capital 
stock two periods  later. The timing  of the value put in place during  each 
of the two years depends on the type of capital  being produced.  Let w1 
be the fraction  of expenditure  on the project  during  the first  year  of con- 
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the second year. Then value put in place during  any period  t is given by 
(10)  It  =  w1St  +  W2St-I  (W1  +  W2  =  1), 
which replaces equation 3 when projects take two years to complete. 
According  to equation 10, investment  in the current  period consists of 
two components: w,St, which is the value put in place during  the first 
year of projects  started  in the current  period, and w2St1 ,, the value put 
in  place  during  the second year  of projects  started  in the previous  period. 
Minimizing  the function 1 for a time path of capital Kt, as in the 
previous  case, results  in the expression 
A  ~~~~~~~~~~1 
=  v  -  (1 -  h)Kt+I -  [w1(ct -  (1 -  h)bc6,?) 
(11)  b  2d 
+  bw2(t+  I  -  (1 -  h)bct+2)], 
which shows how the number of projects started today depends on 
expected demand  conditions  when the project  is completed  two periods 
later, and on the quasi-change  in the cost of investment  during  each of 
the two periods. The latter costs are discounted and weighted by the 
value-put-in-place  weights. Note that Kt+  1  is predetermined  at the time 
that S, is being decided by the firm, so that 11 is a legitimate  decision 
rule. Equation 11 shows that the impact on investment today of an 
anticipated  decline in the cost of investment  goods in the next period  is 
more  complicated  than  in the one-period  case. This impact  is negative  if 
and  only if w1(1  -  h) >  W2. According  to the U.S. survey data  reported 
below, w1 = 0.84 and w2  0.16, so that this inequality  is satisfied  for 
reasonable economic depreciation rates. Hence the possibilities for 
destabilizing  effects of anticipated  policies remain.  The impact  of a fall 
in capital costs two periods in the future is also negative on today's 
investment  decisions. 
To obtain  expressions  for the forecasted  demand  and cost terms  one 
can continue  to assume that firms'  forecasts of demand  are determined 
by 5 and  that  ct  varies  according  to the investment  stabilization  policy 6. 
Then Y  + 2  =  a2  Yt  and ct+ I =  ag Yt  so that starts are given by 
(12)  St = A2zt +  hKt+1, 
where 
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Finally,  total investment  in period  t is obtained  from 10, which  results  in 
(13)  I, =  A2(wlzt  +  w2zt-I)  +  w,hKt+l  +  w2hK,. 
Gross investment is now the sum of two net investment terms and 
two replacement  terms. In replacing  depreciating  capital,  the firm  has to 
look ahead  one period  because it must invest now to bring  replacement 
capital  on line after the end of the next period. Its replacement  expen- 
ditures today are the sum of the first-period  costs of newly started 
replacement  capital, w,hKt?,,  and second-period  expenditures  on re- 
placement  capital  whose construction  began  last period, w2hKt. 
Similarly,  the firm's  net investment  expenditures  are the sum of first- 
period costs of new net investment projects, stimulated by today's 
change in demand,  w1A2zt,  and the second-period  costs of yesterday's 
net investment, which was stimulated  by yesterday's demand  change, 
w2A2Zt  I1. Thus equation 13 is a distributed  lag accelerator  equation  for 
net investment, where the lag distribution has the  same shape as 
the value-put-in-place  weights. As before, the magnitude  of the accel- 
erator  coefficient, A2, depends negatively on the investment stabilizer 
parameter,  g. 
The impact of the investment policy parameter  on the accelerator 
coefficients for one- and two-period  projects is shown in the diagram 
below, where it is assumed  that  the value v is the same  for both  projects. 
Both accelerators  decline linearly  with g. The two-period  accelerator, 
A2, is smaller  for all values of g than the one-period  accelerator,  AI, as 
long as demand  disturbances  are not permanent  (a <  1). However, the 
slopes  of the relations  depend  on the weighting,  discount,  and  persistence 
parameters.  The impact  of g on AI is greater  than its effect on A2  if a + 
w1 (1  -  ab)b-I  <  1. Thus shifting toward the shorter projects  during 
recessions will be more  likely the shorter  is the expected duration  of the 
recession, the smaller  is the value put in place in the first  period of the 
two-period  projects, and the larger is the discount factor. These are 
exactly the circumstances  under  which firms  could get more out of the 
temporarily  low price for investment goods by switching to quicker 
construction  projects. For example, if the value-put-in-place  weights 
are uniform (wI =  0.5), the above condition reduces to 0.5(a  +  b- 1)  <  1 
or r <  1 -  a, where r is the discount rate (b =  (1 +  r)- 1). Hence  shifting 
toward shorter  building  projects will occur only if the discount rate is 






Stabilizer r  ule, g 
a  =  0.9 there is no cost shifting  in this case. Note that regardless  of the 
relative  marginal  effects of g on Al and  A2, the value of g that makes  A2 
equal to zero leaves Al positive. Thus if g is chosen to eliminate the 
accelerator in two-period projects, there will still be fluctuations in 
single-period  projects. 
GENERAL  MULTIPERIOD  PROJECTS 
An extension to  the more general case  of  projects with longer 
construction  times is relatively straightforward.  The capital  accumula- 
tion equation  for projects  that take n periods  to complete  is given by 
(14)  K,  =  K,+nI  +? St -hKt+lz_l 
The level of starts  that minimizes  the cost function  is given by 
I 
(15)  St  =  vY,+11 -  (1  -h)Kt+,,- 
b-n- 
I-  biwi+?(c^t+i  -  b(l  -  h)c^t+i+  ), 
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where  K,?,,  -1  is predetermined  at  time  t. (Note in  the summation  notation 
that c, =  ct.) Starts at time t depend on demand  conditions n periods 
later  and  on the discounted  and  expenditure-weighted  sum  of investment 
costs during  the next n periods.  18 
Assuming  the forecasting  model  and  investment  funds  policy given in 
the previous section, the expected future  level of demand  and expected 
future costs  can be calculated.  These are Y?,+,  =  allYt  and 6t?i  gaiY, 
i =  1, 2, .  Substituting  these expressions into the starts equation, 
one obtains 
(16)  St =  Anzt +  hKt+-1, 
where 
b-z  s- 
A,l =  vat' -  d g  aibiwi+Il  (1 -  ab(l  -  h)). 
This is just a generalization  of the one- and two-period  cases consid- 
ered above. In period  t the firm  starts  constructing  capital  to replace  the 
depreciation that will occur between periods t +  n -  1  and t +  n. It also 
starts  to construct  net additions  to the capital stock on the basis of the 
latest change  in demand,  zt. The accelerator  coefficient,  A,, is a general 
formula  that includes the previously  derived expressions for AI and  A2 
as special cases. 
Because A,, is a function of n, and the response of A,, to g is also 
dependent  on n, one finds as before that the investment stabilization 
policy has different total and marginal  effects for each value of the 
gestation  period. 
Investment  expenditures  in period  t are  now a distributed  lag of starts 
over n periods, where the lag weights are just the value-put-in-place 
weights  for n-period  capital: 
(17)  It =  w1St +  w2St-I  +  .  .  +  w,nSt,,+, 
where again  the value-put-in-place  weights sum to 1. 
This expression  for investment, together  with 16, gives the n-period 
18. By multiplying  through  on the right-hand  side of 15  by b'l,  it can be seen that the 
expected capacity gap n periods in the future is being discounted  by the appropriate 
discount  factor.  The optimal  level of starts  is a weighted  average  of the expected  capacity 
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investment  equation, 
I, =  A,,(wIz, +  W2Zt-  +  .  .  .  +  wz  +) 
(  18)  +  h(wlKt?,,-i  +  .  .  .  +  w,zKt) 
= All  wi+lzt-i  + h  wiKt+z-i. 
i=O  i=l 
Just as before, this is a distributed  lag accelerator  equation  because 
investment  expenditures  are a weighted sum of n periods' starts, each 
determined  by the contemporaneous  change  in demand. 
INVESTMENT  WITH  CONSTRUCTION  PROJECTS 
OF  DIFFERENT  LENGTHS 
In reality the capital stock is heterogeneous  and composed of types 
of capital that take many different time periods to complete. It is 
necessary to disaggregate  capital  according  to the time it takes to build 
each unit and then consider the empirical  problem  of determining  the 
effects of this disaggregation  on total investment. 
To interpret  the approach  to aggregation  used here, it is helpful to 
suppose  that  the economy consists of M heterogeneous  classes of firms, 
each  making  investment  decisions  according  to the investment  equations 
derived  above:  type n firms  would  use capital  with  n-period  construction 
times. Aggregate  investment would then consist of the sum of each of 
these investment  expenditures.  If the cost functions  for these firms  differ 
only by the capital  output  ratio and the value-put-in-place  weights, and 
if the shares of each of these firms in total economy-wide output is 
constant,  the aggregation  is particularly  straightforward. 
Let v,2 be the capital-output  ratio for type n firms. With constant 
output shares, the measure  of output  in these capital-output  ratios can 
be total economy-wide  output.  Let w,0j  be the value-put-in-place  weights 
for type n firms where j  =  1, . . . n (with w1I =  1). Denote  the capital 
stock of type n firms  in period t by K,,t.  Then the starts by type n firms 
are  given  by equation  15  with  v,,  replacing  v, w,0j  replacing  wj,  and  K,,t ,  -_  1 
replacing  Kt?,-  1. Total starts are a sum of starts by each type of firm, 
adding  over M classes of firms: 
M  M 
(19)  St =  Z St  =  (A,zt +  hK,?,t+tz_). 
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Total  investment  is now a double-weighted  sum. Investment  by type 
n firms  is a weighted sum of starts  over n periods, and total investment 
is a further  weighted  sum of investment  over M classes of firms.  Adding 
M equations  analogous  to 18, one obtains 
M 
(20)  It =  I,,  =  (Alw1l + A2w21 +  .  .  .  +  AMwM1)zt 
1Z= 1 
+  (A2w22  +  +  AMWM2)Zt-1 
+  AMWMMZt,M+1 
+h(w11Kl,t +  w22K2,t  +  ...  +  WMMKM,t) 
+  h(w21K2,t+1  +  .  ..  +  WM,M-1KM,t,1) 
+  WM1KM,t+M_1 
M M 
=-,  wij (Aizt-j+1 + hKi,t+i-?)- 
j=li=j 
where Ai is the accelerator  coefficient for investment in capital goods 
that  take i periods  to build. 
The accelerator  mechanism  in 20 has the same functional  form as 18 
but  its interpretation  is substantially  different.  The  distributed  lag  weights 
depend on the investment  policy rule but these weights, and hence the 
impact  of policy on investment, are a convolution  of the distributional 
weights  for  value  put  in  place  for  each  type  of capital  and  the  distributional 
weights of each type of capital in the total capital stock. To assess the 
impact of investment stabilization  policy, it is necessary to be able to 
distinguish  between these two distributions. Clearly a reduced-form 
estimation of regression coefficients using an aggregated  accelerator 
function for investment will not reveal the decomposition of  each 
coefficient  into the two weighting  schemes. Moreover, such aggregate 
estimates will not reveal how the policy rule affects investment.19 
19. This is the problem  emphasized  in Lucas, "Econometric  Policy Evaluation:  A 
Critique." John B.  Taylor  81 
However, by directly obtaining the parameters  a, b, wij, and vi it is 
possible to evaluate the effect of a change in stabilization  policy, as I 
show below for the investment  funds system.20 
Anticipating  Recessions and Destabilization 
The above treatment  of the investment  finds system has emphasized 
its potential  for stabilization.  The effect of such a system was shown 
unambiguously  to reduce the size of the accelerator coefficients and 
thereby  reduce  the procyclical  fluctuations  in investment.  No possibility 
of a perverse increase in the procyclical fluctuations-a  destabilizing 
effect-was  found. Destabilization  might  occur if the forecasting  model 
used by firms allowed for the possibility of forecasting recessions in 
advance.  As discussed  above, replacing  the first-order  forecasting  model 
with  a second-order  model  is one way to do this. With  such a forecasting 
process, firms  might  forecast a deepening recession and a lower price 
for investment goods and thereby reduce investment expenditures 
during  the early part  of a recession, perhaps  making  investment  expen- 
ditures  more  procyclical. 
Suppose demand  follows a second-order  process, 
(21)  Yt+I =  OlYt +  t2Yt-I +  Ut+l. 
For a typical model of business cycle fluctuations,  oxl  >  0, c  <  0 and 
Ot  +  cx2  <  1. To see how this formulation  can lead to forecasts of 
continued  recession or expansion, imagine  that  the economy was at full 
employment  (Yt_  =  0). Then the beginning  of a recession in period 
t(Y, <  0) will lead to a forecast of worse recession in the next year 
20. An alternative  aggregation  approach  that also leads to equation  20 is to suppose 
that  the firm  uses capital  that  is heterogeneous  by gestation  lag, and  therefore  must  make 
a capital  investment  decision  for each type of capital.  A particularly  simple  generalization 
of equation  1  represents  the cost minimization  problem  of such  a firm  by 
E  b' L-  E (VY,  -  Kj)2 +  E  C1Ij,]  *  2  itii= 
where (v,,  v-,  . ..,v,,)  is the minimum point on the U-shaped  cost  curve.  If there are no 
cross effects  between  Kj, and Kj, as in this expression,  and if cj, =  cj, for all i and j,  the 
optimal  decision  rules for investment  are given by 18  with v;  replacing  v for each type of 
investment. Thus the aggregate  investment equation 20 is consistent with this cost 
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(Yt+  1 <  Y,)  if ox1  >  1. Similarly,  the start  of a boom (Yt  > 0) will lead to a 
forecast of a continued  expansion  in the next year (Yt+  1  >  Y,)  if cx1  >  1. 
In both these examples the economy is forecast to move further  away 
from full employment  for a while, a feature that the first-order  model 
cannot  capture  and  that could lead to destabilization. 
This  possibility  can be examined  for  the case of single-period  projects. 
A decision rule  for investment  expenditures  is obtained  by substituting 
the forecasts from  21 into 4, using  the policy function  6 to obtain 
(22)  It  Blzt + B2Zt-1 + hKt, 
where 
B1  vo1 --  (1 -  ox1b(1  -  h)) 
bd 
B2  =  2 (v  +  -(1  -  h)). 
d 
The accelerator  coefficient,  B1, is much like the accelerator  coefficient, 
Al, in 8. However,  with ox1  >  1  it is possible for ox1b(1  -  h) >  I and hence 
for an increase  in g to raise this accelerator  coefficient. 
In the case of a decline in demand,  for example, investment  falls off 
because firms  expect a further  decline in the next year, but this fall is 
magnified  by the expected decline in capital costs that the investment 
funds system will generate.  This in itself is clearly  destabilizing. 
Compared  with the previous  accelerator  formulation,  however, there 
is now an additional  lagged  effect, B2. If  2 is negative,  B2  will  be negative 
also, so that a positive change in output  in the previous period  reduces 
investment.  The coefficient  B2 is also affected by the investment  funds 
system, g.  In the case in which col >  1 so there is a possibility of 
destabilization,  the effect of g on B2 offsets the effect on B;. The net 
effect is summarized  by the sum  of the accelerator  coefficients,  B1 + B2. 
This sum is a linear decreasing function of g as long as col +  CX2 < 
b - 1(1  -  h)- 1, a condition  that is insured by the stability of the output 
process. Thus if the output  process itself is stable, the investment  funds 
system will reduce  the sum of the accelerator  parameters. 
FEEDBACK  AND  ENDOGENOUS  OUTPUT 
Throughout  this  analysis  it has  been assumed  that  the demand  process 
facing  firms  is exogenous. This would be a reasonable  approximation  if John B.  Taylor  83 
the industry  was relatively small, or if the demand  process was truly 
external,  generated  by fluctuations  in the demand  for exports  for exam- 
ple. In the empirical  applications  I focus on manufacturing  industries 
whose investment  decisions represent  a relatively small component  of 
total demand;  these industries  also have large export markets, so that 
the exogeneity assumption  is reasonable. 
The most satisfactory way to deal with this endogeneity question 
would be to model the other components  of aggregate  demand  (such as 
consumption) and to use the national income identity to develop a 
dynamic process for aggregate demand that depends on investment 
expenditures.  This dynamic  process should  then be the same as the one 
firms  use to forecast demand.  Without  examining  in detail a full macro 
model, it seems clear that the major qualitative conclusions about 
investment  stabilization  developed by assuming  that demand  is exoge- 
nous would not change. (This can easily be shown in the context of a 
first-order  model.) But one result that would clearly emerge  from a full 
macro analysis is that the fluctuations  in GDP are reduced  as a conse- 
quence of a more stable investment  process. Given that  one of the aims 
of such a stabilization scheme is to reduce the fluctuations  in total 
demand  and employment, this is an important  fact to be kept in mind 
when assessing its welfare  implications.  The assumption  that  demand  is 
exogenous is made in this paper  merely  for convenience. Although  it is 
probably  a reasonable approximation  in the empirical  work, it is not 
meant to suggest that the feedback effects of such a system on total 
demand  are necessarily  negligible. 
The Effects of Policy on Investment Fluctuations 
The central qualitative  result of the theoretical analysis is that the 
countercyclical  impact  of the investment  funds system should show up 
in the parameters  of a regression  equation  of investment  on the changes 
in real output. As is clear in 18, if the system is working  successfully, 
these accelerator  parameters  should  be small in absolute  value or even 
negative. In nonparametric  terms, if the system is effective, it should 
reduce  business cycle fluctuations  in investment  by breaking  the corre- 
lation  between investment  and  the cyclical components  of demand. 
In testing  for these results, it is important  to use an investment  series 
that  does not include  public  investment  because it is possible that  public 84  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
expenditures  would be countercyclical  and thereby offset some of the 
business cycle fluctuation in private investment. I concentrated on 
annual  expenditures  on nonresidential  structures  in the manufacturing 
industries. 
In figure  2 the time-series  behavior  of total  manufacturing  investment 
in structures  during  the 1959-78  period  in Sweden is plotted along with 
the change in total real GDP and real output  originating  in manufactur- 
ing-two  alternative  measures of demand. (Note that the variables in 
figure  2 are  not detrended.)  Even allowing  for the distributed  lag  between 
changes  in demand  and  investment,  there  does not appear  to be evidence 
of a positive accelerator  mechanism  in the data  during  the period  through 
the early 1970s. If anything, the relation seems negative during this 
period. In the late 1970s, however, after the investment  funds system 
had ceased to be countercyclical,  there does appear  to be evidence of a 
positive accelerator  mechanism. 
For comparison,  in figure  3 the same variables  for the United States 
are plotted for the same sample period. Although the U.S.  data are 
dominated  by a boom  in manufacturing  structures  investment  in the mid- 
1960s,  the figure  provides evidence of a lagged accelerator  mechanism 
at work. The boom in investment  follows the higher  growth  rates in the 
1960s;  and though  much smaller,  the swings in investment  in the 1970s 
follow the fluctuations  in demand. 
Because of the dynamic  relation  between investment  and  output, the 
accelerator  coefficients estimated by regression  methods offer a more 
systematic way  to  examine the  cyclical  variability of  investment. 
Table 2 reports several alternative accelerator-type  regressions esti- 
mated  for Sweden during  the 1960s  and 1970s.  To correspond  with the 
structural  model considered in the next section, the length of  the 
distributed  lag is three periods for all the regressions. However, the 
general  findings  are  not affected  by extending  the lag  length  beyond  three 
periods. Both real GDP and manufacturing  output  are used as demand 
variables.21  Regardless  of which  measure  of demand  is used, in the 1961- 
75  period  very little  of the variation  in investment  is explained  by demand 
21. For these regression  equations  I have not included  a measure  of depreciation, 
which  is a function  of future  values of the capital  stock. The lagged  capital  stock entered 
with the wrong sign when estimated without constraints in the Swedish equations. 
Moreover,  the decomposition  of variables  into cyclical and secular  components  using a 
simple  detrending  procedure  seems particularly  strained  when  applied  to the capital  stock. John  B.  Taylor  85 
Figure 2.  Investment  and Output Change in Sweden, 1959-78 
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fluctuations,  and the accelerator  coefficients are small. In some cases 
the  coefficients  are  negative,  as is possible  according  to the interpretation 
in this paper of the countercyclical effects of the investment funds 
system. Table 2 also reports  regressions  for a later sample period that 
includes more of the 1970s  and less of the 1960s.  The sum of the coef- 
ficients in this period, which is dominated  by a permanent  funds sys- 
tem, is positive reflecting  the procyclical  behavior evident in figure  2. 
Similar  regressions  are  reported  in table  3 for  the United  States  during 
1961-75. The accelerator  coefficients are all positive and much larger 
than  those for Sweden. Clearly  the accelerator  mechanism  was operating 
much more strongly in the United States than in Sweden during  this 
period.  Given  the evidence in table 1  of the large  policy-induced  cyclical 
swings in the price of investment goods in Sweden and the fact that a 
similar  mechanism  was not operating  in the United States, it appears 
that the investment funds system did succeed in smoothing out the 
cyclical swings in investment.22 
The estimate  of the effect of the system implied  in these comparisons 
is quite large. It is possible that the observed accelerator  coefficients 
22. On a purely  formal  basis this characterization  of the investment  funds  system has 
a number  of similarities  with the investment  tax credit  used in the United States during 
this period. During  a release of investment  funds  the price of investment  goods paid  by 
firms  is reduced  much  as a tax  credit  on investment  expenditures  would  reduce  the  effective 
price  paid  by firms.  Although  there  is no direct  correspondence  in an investment  tax credit 
system  to the allocation  component  of the investment  funds  system, this latter  component 
does not  appear  to have  any  countercyclical  influence  anyway  and  is more  like  a permanent 
reduction  in the corporate  tax rate. 
However, there were a number  of differences  between the investment  funds system 
and  the operation  of the investment  tax credit  in  practice.  Most  important  for  a comparison 
of structures  investment  in Sweden and the United  States was that the tax credit  did not 
apply  to structures  in the United States, as defined  in the tax code. Thus, except for the 
fact  that  much  equipment  investment  is tied to structures  investment,  the tax credit  would 
not be expected to affect investment  in manufacturing  structures.  Although  there were 
some  countercyclical  changes  in  the  credit,  it is difficult  to determine  whether  such  changes 
were  expected  by firms.  Because  there  was no explicit  announcement  that  the credit  would 
change  countercyclically,  firms'  forecasts  of such  changes  would  be subject  to considerable 
uncertainty.  In  fact, the credit  was first  enacted  during  a period  of below-normal  economic 
activity  in 1962,  suspended  temporarily  in 1966  during  a boom, and eventually  repealed 
later  in that  same  boom  in 1969.  It was reinstated  during  a period  of low economic  activity 
in 1971,  and  was increased  during  the 1975  recession  from  7 to 10  percent  before  becoming 
essentially  permanent.  Although  in its early  stages  the credit  had  many  of the same  ex post 
countercyclical  features as the investment  funds system, it is unlikely  that firms  had a 
countercyclical  expectation  about  its behavior  ex ante. 88  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
Figure 3.  Investment  and Output Change in the United States, 1959-78 
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attributable to the system  could be the result of measurement errors in 
the output data. The use of two alternative measures  of demand is an 
attempt  to check for the effects of measurement  error. It is interesting 
to note, however, that  the general  finding  that  the procyclical  movement 
in investment was offset by the system is  similar to the results of 
Eliasson's survey  of individual  firms  undertaken  in 1962-63.  The survey 
attempted  to determine  the net effect of the release  of 1962-63  by asking 
firms  what projects would have been undertaken  if the funds had not C74  r41  ClO 
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been available.  According  to this survey, the net effect in the 1962-63 
release  was  just about  enough  to smooth  out what  would have appeared 
to be a typical accelerator  reaction of investment expenditures  to the 
changes  in demand  during  that cycle.23 
Although  the theoretical  discussion  shows that  one cannot  distinguish 
between the demand  effect and the policy effect in these accelerators 
without  knowledge  of g(c, and Y,  are  collinear),  for  completeness  I report 
in table  4 the results  of directly  including  c, in the accelerator  equations. 
Movements  in c, that are not perfectly  linearly  tied to Y,  could show up 
in the regression and change the accelerator  coefficients. The sample 
period  is extremely  short  and not strictly  comparable  with the results  in 
table 2 (c, is only tabulated  through 1972),  and the standard  errors  are 
large; but the results offer some additional  evidence that the system 
stabilized  investment.  The cost variable,  c,  enters with a negative  sign, 
and the sum of the accelerator coefficients increases in a procyclical 
direction.  When  current  and lagged  c, are in the equation,  the change  in 
ct is shown to predominate  and the accelerator  coefficients move more 
in a procyclical  direction  when GDP  is the demand  variable. 
To investigate  the  extent to which  movements  in c,  were  approximated 
by a simple linear  function of Yt,  ct was regressed  on Yt  over 1958-75, 
with Yt  again  the deviation  of GDP  from  trend.  The coefficient  on Y,  was 
0.00125  with a t-ratio  of 1.3. Regressing  ct on Yt  and Yt  -  1 over the same 
sample  period  gave coefficients  of 0.0017  and 0.0001  with an F-ratio  for 
the regression  of 1.7. The  R2  were only 0.15 and  0.27 in these regressions. 
Although the signs of these coefficients confirm the countercyclical 
behavior of the investment funds system, these seemingly poor fits 
probably  reflect  the bad timing  of some of the movements  in ct shown in 
figure 1 (the largest residual occurs in  1959) as well as the linear 
approximation  to the operation of the system. A nonlinear  switching 
model  for ct  might  fit the data  better. 
Structural Analysis and Policy Evaluation 
While  the above regressions  give some quantitative  evidence that the 
investment  funds system was working,  they are incapable  of providing 
23.  See  Eliasson,  "Investment  Funds,"  diagram 111:2,  p. 73, or Lindbeck,  Swedish 
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estimates  of how much  the system reduced  investment  fluctuations.  For 
this, one needs an estimate  of what  the cyclical variability  of investment 
would  have been under  a different  policy regime  in which  the investment 
funds  system was not in operation  (g = 0). Moreover,  for policy design 
questions it is important  to know how investment would behave for 
other values of g. If a scheme like the investment funds system was 
being considered at another time or place, it would be important  to 
choose g appropriately.  For example,  one would  want  to avoid choosing 
a g so large that investment became significantly  countercyclical. To 
address  these issues, estimates are needed of the structural  parameters 
of the model: value-put-in-place  weights, capital-output  ratios, depre- 
ciation  rates, discount  rate, and  parameters  of the forecasting  rules  used 
by firms. 
The focus here is on the heterogenous capital model with building 
projects of one, two, and three periods (the U.S.  survey data suggest 
that a large fraction of industrial  building  is completed in three years) 
and  on the accelerator  models with GDP  as the measure  of demand.  The 
first-order  model for firms'  forecasts of demand  conditions  is used, and 
it is assumed that the linear  policy rule is a good approximation.  Using 
the equations  derived  in the theoretical  discussion, the full three-period 
model  is then summarized  in the following  system of equations: 
A1 
(23)  Sit =  v,Y,+l  -  ((ct  -  b(l  -  h)Ct+1)  -  (1 -h)Kl,  bd 
1 
S2t  =  V2y+2  -  b2d Lw2c +  b(w22 -  w21(l  -  h))c^+ 
-  b2(1 -  h)w22^t+2]  -  (1 -  h)K2t+  l, 
1 
S3t  =  V3  Y,+3-  b3d Lw3c  +  b(W32 -  W31(1  -  h))6^+  1 
+  b2  (w33  -  W32(1  -  h))c,+2  -  b3(1  -  h)W33C^,+3]  -  (1 -  h)K3t+2, 
I,t=  sit, 
I2. =  W21S2t  +  W22S2t  -, 
IR  =  W31S3t  +  W32S3t-1  +  W33S3R2, 
It  =  Ilt  +  I2t  +  I3t, 
Y,+i=  aiY,, 
Ct =  g Yt. John B.  Taylor  93 
Substituting  the  forecasting  formulas  and  the  policy rule  into  the starts 
equations  and substituting  those in turn into the investment equation, 
the accelerator  model is obtained: 
(24)  It  =  JlZt  +  r32Z-I  +  I3Zt-2, 
where  PI  = wI1AI  +  w21A2 +  w31A3, 
-2 = w22A2  +  w32A3, 
P3  =  W33A3, 
Al  =  via  -  g (I  -  ab(l  -  h)), 
bd 
A2 =v-a2  -  g  (w21  +  abw22)(1 -  ab(1 -h)), 
b d 
A3 =  v3a3  -  g(W31  +  abw32 +  a2b2w33)(1  -ab(1  -  h)),  b3d 
with 'the  depreciation  terms omitted  from  the investment  equation.  The 
parameters  of the model are fourteen  in number-w1 1,W21,  W31,  W22, W32, 
W33,  h, v1,  V2,  v3, a, g, b, and  d. However, the value-put-in-place  weights 
sum to one for each type of project so that there are effectively eleven 
free parameters. 
The estimates  of the value-put-in-place  weights  were obtained  from  a 
survey of nonresidential  construction  conducted  by the U.S. Bureau  of 
the Census. The results  of several separate  census surveys are shown in 
table  5, after  aggregation  into three  gestation  classes as explained  in the 
notes to the table. The weights are fairly stable for the three surveys.24 
The 1978  survey  was used  for estimates  of the value-put-in-place  weights 
in the model. 
The average  ratio  of the net real  stock of manufacturing  plants  to total 
real GDP in Sweden in the 1958-75 period was 0.20. In a model with 
only one type of capital, this would be a reasonable  value to choose for 
24. The finding  that the weights are stable is potentially  important  in itself because 
there is a possibility that these weights could change as projects are completed more 
quickly  or more slowly, depending  on the stage of the cycle. This has been raised  as a 
criticism  against  the gestation  approach  to investment  behavior.  (See, for example, my 
comments  on Finn E. Kydland and Edward  C. Prescott, "A Competitive  Theory of 
Fluctuations  and the Feasibility and Desirability  of Stabilization  Policy," in Stanley 
Fischer,  ed.,  Rational  Expectations  and  Economic  Policy  (the  University  of  Chicago 
Press, 1980),  pp. 191-94).  If the stability  observed  in this survey  holds  up, this criticism  is 
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Table 5.  Completion  Time and Value Put in Place for Nonresidential  Building 
Projects,  1976-79a 
Fraction  of value put in place  each  yearb 
Projects  completed  Projects  completed  Projects  completed 
in 1976-77  in 1978  in 1979 
Dur  ation 
of  First  Second  Third  First  Second  Third  First  Second  Third 
project  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Year  Yeair 
One year  1.00  ...  ...  1.00  ...  ...  1.00  ..  ... 
Two years  0.79  0.21  . .  .  0.82  0.18  . .  .  0.83  0.17  ... 
Three years  0.50  0.39  0.11  0.49  0.37  0.14  0.54  0.35  0.11 
Sources:  U.S  Bureau of the Census,  Constriuctioni  Reports,  series  C30,  Valiue of New} Conistruictioni  Piut inz  Place, 
December  1978, August  1979, and August  1980. A  supplement  to  each  issue  contains  survey  data on  completion 
time and progress payments for construction  projects in the  United  States. 
a.  The data are constructed  by aggregating eight cost  classes  into three completion  time classes:  projects costing 
more than $5 million were placed  in the three-year  class;  those  from $3 million to $5 million,  in the two-year  class; 
and those  that were less  than $3 million,  in the one-year  class.  The annual value-put-in-place  data for the two-  and 
three-year projects  were  constructed  from monthly  data.  When less  than  100 percent  of the  projects  was  installed 
by the end of the assumed  two-  or three-year  horizon,  the value  put in place was adjusted upward to reach the  100 
percent value (the lowest  percent in the three surveys  was 93). 
b. In 1976-77,  8,000 projects were completed;  in 1978, there were  5,000; and in 1979, there were  5,700. 
v, the desired capital-output  ratio. In a disaggregated  model the sum of 
the individual  vi should also equal this total aggregate  capital-output 
ratio.  In the model, I therefore  set v, +  V2  +  V3  =  0.20. Without  data  on 
the type of capital  used in manufacturing  in Sweden, it is not possible to 
calculate the individual vi. Since the composition of manufacturing 
output  could be quite different  in Sweden than  in the United States, the 
U.S. survey data  used to construct  the value-put-in-place  weights could 
be misleading.25  For this reason U.S.  survey data were not used to 
estimate  the vi  parameters. 
An estimate for a was obtained  by regressing  detrended  GDP on its 
lagged value (a first-order  autoregression)  over the 1961-75 sample 
period.  The value was 0.44 with a t-ratio  of 1.6. (It should  be noted that 
a second-order  autoregression  estimated  over the same sample  gives co- 
efficients  of 0.64 and - 0.44 with t-ratios  of 2.2 and -  1.5, respectively. 
This same approach  could be used for the second-order  model.) 
An estimate  of g = 0.00125  was obtained  from  the regression  of ct on 
Yt  described  earlier.  The value of the discount  factor b was taken to be 
0.94, corresponding  to the average nominal  interest rate of 6.5 percent 
25. This problem  was pointed out by Stanley Fischer in his comments  on an early 
version  of this paper.  The problem  seems more severe for vi  than  for wq, but in principle 
could  also raise  problems  for wi4.  Hence the policy evaluation  results  reported  here  are  by 
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during  1961-72. The value of the depreciation  rate, h, was taken to be 
0.026, the value reported  earlier  and calculated  from  actual  estimates  of 
depreciation. 
This leaves three  parameters:  d, vl, and v2, withV3  =  0.20 -  v, -  v2. 
These are calculated  by setting  the three coefficients  of the accelerator 
model, PI,  12,  and P3,  to zero, which  reflects  the general  finding  from  the 
unconstrained  accelerator models reported  in table 2 for the 1961-75 
sample  for the case in which demand  is measured  by GDP.26  Given the 
13  values, the expressions following equation  24 can then be solved for 
vI, v2, and d. The results are v1 =  0.03, v2 =  0.06, and d =  0.07. Hence 
V3 =  0.11. 
Given these numerical values, the effect of the investment funds 
system on the distributed  lag accelerator  coefficients can be evaluated 
by setting  g = 0 and calculating  the values of the 3 coefficients.27  These 
values are 0.0266, 0.0056, and  0.0013, respectively. When  g = 0.00075, 
which is about a 40 percent reduction  in the strength  of the system, the 
values are 0.0108, 0.0023, and 0.0008. The value of these coefficients  at 
g = 0 characterizes  how procyclical  investment  might  have been if the 
investment  funds system were not in operation. 
These coefficients are somewhat smaller  than might have been sus- 
pected. Their sum, 0.034, is at most one-half  of the sum of the uncon- 
strained  accelerator  coefficients  estimated  for the United States and  for 
the period in Sweden during  which the system was not in effect. Thus, 
according  to this structural  interpretation,  one should not attribute  the 
small  accelerator  parameters  in the reduced  form  models entirely  to the 
26. The choice of zero for the a  coefficients can be considered as a smoothness 
constraint  that is statistically consistent with the data. A better approach, which is 
unfortunately  not an option  here, would  be to use technological  data  on the v's that  would 
put  implicit  constraints  on the lag distribution  of the 1's. Zero  was chosen rather  than  the 
estimated  coefficients  because  of the  high  standard  error  associated  with  these  coefficients. 
Minor  changes  in the a coefficients  can change  the structural  parameters  in major  ways 
and  can lead to implausible  values  for these parameters.  For example,  some of the actual 
estimated  coefficients  in table  2 lead  to negative  values  for  v2.  A slight  change  in the sample 
period  for the unconstrained  estimates  generated  plausible  values  for the v's even though 
there  was little  perceptible  differences  in the 1's. It is not surprising  that  the unconstrained 
X values  have high  standard  errors  given the multicollinearity  problems. 
27. To summarize,  the parameter  values  are  as follows:  value-put-in-place  weights  for 
each type of capital, w  =  1.00,  w21  =  0.82, W22 =  0.18,  w31  =  0.49, W32 =  0.37, W33 = 
0.14;  depreciation  rate, h =  0.026;  autoregressive  parameter,  a = 0.44;  investment  funds 
policy rule  parameter,  g =  0.00125;  discount  rate, b = 0.94; capital-output  ratio  for each 
type of capital,  v, =  0.03, v2 =  0.06, V3  =  0. 11; and  curvature  of U-shaped  cost function, 
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investment  funds system. Another reason for these low coefficients is 
the small  persistence  parameter,  a. According  to the model, low values 
of a indicate  that  cyclical fluctuations  in demand  are  rather  transient  and 
would not therefore  stimulate  much new investment. Higher  values for 
a would  raise the accelerator  coefficients  significantly,  as is clearly  seen 
in the expressions following equation 24. It should be noted that the 
value for a estimated  over the 1966-78  sample  period  was 0.77, consid- 
erably  higher  than the 0.44 value estimated  over the earlier  period and 
used in this structural  analysis. This higher  persistence could in itself 
raise the accelerator coefficient as observed (in table 2) for Sweden. 
According  to these estimates, the standard  deviation  of the fluctuations 
in manufacturing  structures  investment from trend would have been 
about 0.12 billion kronor  higher  in 1975  prices if the investment  funds 
system had been in operation.  This compares  with a standard  deviation 
for the change  in real  GDP  about  trend  of 4.5 billion  kronor  as calculated 
from  the estimated  autoregressive  model. 
Concluding Remarks 
The main empirical  findings  of this study indicate that the Swedish 
investment  funds system reduced  the cyclical fluctuations  in investment 
during  the late 1950s  and 1960s.  The system had a major  impact  on the 
effective price that firms  paid for investment  goods, and in general  this 
impact was countercyclical  with the price being relatively low during 
recessions and high during  booms. Such countercyclical  price effects 
would be expected to shift firms'  investment  plans in a countercyclical 
direction.  In fact, the procyclical  variability  of investment  in manufac- 
turing structures-as  measured by an accelerator formulation-was 
shown to be negligible  while the system was in operation  in Sweden, a 
result  that contrasts  with similar  investment  series in the United States. 
The model  of investment  behavior  used here suggests  that  some of these 
differences  were due to the investment  funds system, but that relatively 
low business cycle persistence during the period was also a factor. 
Although  the analysis indicates that such a scheme could in principle 
destabilize  investment  for certain  forecasting  procedures  used by firms, 
no evidence of such destabilizing  effects was found in the empirical 
analysis. 
The analysis reveals less about the welfare implications  of such a John B.  Taylor  97 
system or about  how it should  be considered  as part  of an overall  system 
of fiscal and monetary  policy rules. It seems clear that any reduction  in 
business  cycle fluctuations  that  does not also make  aggregate  prices less 
stable  is a gain in economic welfare. By reducing  the size of the cyclical 
swings in investment, a policy rule like the investment funds system 
could have such an effect. Viewed in the context of an overall mix of 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy rules, such a system could have an important 
role  as a complement  to other  automatic  stabilizers.  Many  of the current 
automatic  stabilizers  are  oriented  toward  consumption  and  thereby  shift 
the composition  of output away from investment  during  recessions. A 
countercyclical  investment  rule  could offset this bias. The role of such a 
rule could be especially important  if monetary  policy is not used for 
countercyclical  purposes, but instead  is geared  entirely  toward  a steady 
growth  rule  designed  to promote  long-run  stability  of prices. 
APPENDIX  A 
Derivation of the Starts Equation 
AFTER  substituting  for I, in equation 1 using equations 2 and 3, one 
obtains 
(A-1)  >bt  - (vYt  -  K,)2 +  ct(Kt+I  -  (1 -  h)Kt)1 
the expected value of which must be minimized  with respect to the 
sequence K2,  K3, ...  Note two special features  of this problem:  first, 
although  this is a dynamic  stochastic control  problem  (because Yt  and ct 
are random),  it is of the linear  quadratic  form  and therefore  satisfies  the 
certainty  equivalence  assumptions;  that is, one can replace  the random 
variables  by their expectations, Y,  and c6t,  and solve the problem  as if it 
were deterministic. 
Second, each period's decision determines  only one future  period  of 
capital  stock. In the case in which capital  construction  takes one single 
period, the period 1 decision determines  K2, but K3 is not determined 
until  period  2. (However, the initial  conditions  for the period  2 problem 
are altered  by the decision taken  in period 1.) 
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analytic  solution by differentiating  with respect to each of the decision 
variables,  K2, K3.  .  .,  and setting  the derivatives  to zero. The differen- 
tiation with respect to  a given Kt takes the expectation Y, and c, 
conditional  on information  available  in period t -  1, when K, must be 
determined.  For example, the terms  in A-  I that involve K2  are 
(A-2)  b L2  (vY,  -  K,)2 +  cl(K2 -  (I  -  h)K,)1 
+ b2 L2(VY2  -  K2)2 ?  c2(K3 -  (1 -  h)K2), 
where  the hats represent  expectations  at time 1. Hence the derivative  of 
A-  I with respect to K2 is 
(A-3)  bc1 -  b2d(vY2  -  K2) -  b2c^2(1  -  h) =  0, 
or 
1 
(A-4)  K2 =  v Y2  -  bd (c1  -  b(1 -  h)c2) 
But 2 shows that K2 =  K1 +  SI -  hK1, which results in 
1 
(A-5)  S1 =  vY2 -  -  b(1 -  h)62)  -  (1 -  h)K1. 
bd 
The same argument  holds for the determination  of S2 in period 2 and in 
general  for all St; this is the derivation  of equation  4 in the text. For the 
case of longer  gestation  periods the calculations  are similar  except that 
there  will be more terms involving  K2  in equation  A-2. 
This method for solving stochastic control problems  is explained in 
more detail in Thomas J. Sargent,  Macroeconomic Theory  (Academic 
Press, 1979).  A multivariable  generalization  (useful,  for example,  for the 
full multivariate  investment  problem  but with cross terms) is found in 
Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas  J. Sargent, "Linear  Rational  Expecta- 
tions Models for Dynamically Interrelated  Variables," in Robert E. 
Lucas, Jr., and Thomas J. Sargent, eds., Rational Expectations and 
Econometric  Practice, vol. 1  (The  University  of Minnesota  Press, 1981), 
pp. 127-56. The dynamic stochastic programming  approach  to these 
problems  is found in G. C. Chow, "Estimation  of Rational  Expectations 
Models,"  Journal of Economic  Dynamics  and Control, vol.  2 (August 
1980),  pp. 241-55. John B.  Taylor  99 
APPENDIX  B 
THIS  appendix  presents the data on investment,  manufacturing  output, 
and real GDP for Sweden and the United States that were used in the 
tables, figures,  and regressions  in the text. 
Table B-1. Investment  in Manufacturing  Structures, Output in Manufacturing, 
and Real GDP in Sweden and the United States, 1958-78 
Sweden  United States 
(billions of 1975 kronor)  (billions of 1972 dollars) 
Investment  Investment 
in manu-  Manu-  in manu-  Manu- 
facturing  facturing  Real  facturing  facturing  Real 
Year  structures  output  GDP  structuresa  output  GDP 
1958  1.99  31.7  150.4  3.92  153.3  676.3 
1959  2.21  33.5  158.8  3.50  171.2  716.9 
1960  2.60  36.7  164.2  4.74  171.8  732.0 
1961  3.19  39.2  173.4  4.64  172.0  751.0 
1962  2.99  42.3  180.8  4.69  186.7  793.8 
1963  2.92  44.8  189.7  4.71  202.2  825.6 
1964  2.31  50.2  204.5  5.67  216.7  868.9 
1965  2.35  54.0  213.2  8.77  236.7  921.4 
1966  3.02  56.7  219.3  10.83  254.9  977.5 
1967  3.16  57.7  225.4  9.43  254.3  1,003.9 
1968  2.70  61.4  234.1  8.14  268.2  1,050.0 
1969  2.90  66.3  248.2  8.41  277.2  1,079.7 
1970  2.99  70.7  261.4  7.44  261.2  1,077.6 
1971  2.93  72.0  260.9  5.74  266.8  1,112.8 
1972  2.87  73.3  265.2  4.68  292.5  1,175.0 
1973  2.94  78.3  274.1  5.77  325.3  1,239.8 
1974  3.64  82.0  285.6  6.18  311.7  1,230.8 
1975  4.02  80.1  287.9  5.74  289.6  1,220.0 
1976  3.71  79.2  291.6  5.16  317.4  1,284.8 
1977  3.07  74.3  283.8  5.23  338.7  1,354.7 
1978  2.26  74.6  291.6  6.71  356.9  1,416.8 
Sources:  Investment  data on  Sweden  are from unpublished  series  of  the  Swedish  Central Bureau of  Statistics; 
output data on Sweden  are from United  Nations,  Yearbook of National  Account  Statistics,  various  issues.  Data on 
the United States  are from the national income  and product accounts. 
a.  This  series  is the  "industrial buildings"  component  of nonresidential  fixed investment  in the  national income 
and product  accounts.  Industrial  buildings  include  manufacturing plants  and warehouses  and other  buildings  on 
manufacturing plant sites.  Some  structures owned  by manufacturing companies  but not on plant sites (such as center 
city office buildings) are not included  in this series. Comments 
and Discussion 
Martin Neil Baily: John Taylor has presented a clearly written and 
skillful  analysis of the Swedish experiment  with countercyclical  invest- 
ment incentives. As a good econometrician,  he has emphasized  those 
parts of the problem  that were of particular  importance  given the data 
set 'he  is working  with. There are, however, some additional  questions 
that would arise should such a policy regime be suggested as a major 
component  of U.S. stabilization  policy. 
It was not an easy task to distill  from  the intricate  rules  of the Swedish 
system what its central  features  were. I am not familiar  with the details 
of the program,  but Taylor  gives me considerable  confidence  that  he has 
in fact researched  the details  thoroughly  and  been able  to summarize  the 
economic impact of the program.  It substantially  reduced the cost of 
structures  investment  for business during  recession years. Taylor  goes 
on to give careful consideration  to the complexity introduced  because 
investment projects have different  gestation periods. Quite appropri- 
ately, he recycles some of the methodology  he learned  in analyzing  wage 
contracts of one, two, and three years for investment projects with 
gestation  periods  of one, two, and  three years. 
By using information  from U.S. data, Taylor imposes some of the 
parameters  of the lag structure  on his investment  function  for Sweden. 
He assumes that there is fixed time-dimension  of construction  technol- 
ogy, one that is the same for Sweden and  the United States. A business 
decides to build  a new plant  and an order  is placed that specifies a price 
and a completion schedule. On the whole I prefer this assumption  to 
most cost-of-adjustment  models, but it may  be a bit  too rigid.  A business 
could  ask  for more  rapid  completion  at a higher  price.  This  would  require 
a procedure  called "fast-tracking,"  in which the project  is speeded up. 
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In Taylor's model, firms  would have a considerable  incentive to speed 
up projects if the net cost (after allowing for incentive payments) is 
thereby  reduced. This speeding-up  effect may be more important  than 
the possibility he considers whereby firms switch between short- and 
long-term  projects. 
The U.S. parameters  on gestation  lags are combined  with a Swedish 
capital-output  ratio to provide the information  Taylor  needs to identify 
the effect of the investment  stimulus  program.  I admired  how neatly  this 
was done, and the final answer may well be exactly correct. But the 
basic result is governed by the fact that the unconstrained  accelerator 
coefficients are very small during the period when the stabilization 
program  was in effect. Since the capital-output  ratio  suggests  substantial 
coefficients, this means that the program  must be working. However, 
there  are  other  reasons  why the estimated  coefficients  might  be low. For 
example, in a small, open economy there may not be much relation 
between current  and  lagged  GDP changes  and  the demand  for manufac- 
turing  structures.  To support  his findings,  Taylor  looks at another  period 
in Sweden when it did not have the same tax system and at a similar 
regression  for the United States. These results do show larger  uncon- 
strained  accelerator  coefficients  and therefore  strengthen  his case. The 
only reservations are that none of the coefficients is estimated very 
precisely,  and  the equations  do not  explain  a large  fraction  of the variance 
of structures  investment. 
I turn now to two small points about his procedures. First, some 
people have found liquidity  or interest  rate effects on structures  invest- 
ment  to be important.  This  form  of investment  is usually  highly  leveraged. 
Taylor has the basis for calculating  a Jorgenson-style  cost of capital 
series, so why not use it? Second, there  is a relation  between equipment 
investment and structures investment. Businesses do not build new 
structures  to leave them empty. The investment funds, according to 
Taylor, can reduce the cost  of a structure by 30 percent, but the 
percentage  reduction  in  the cost of a whole  project  (including  equipment) 
might  be much smaller. 
The final  point  may be more serious. Arthur  Okun  criticized  counter- 
cyclical  investment  tax credits  in 1972  on the grounds  that  they could be 
destabilizing  because of anticipatory  effects. This line of criticism has 
become much in vogue as part of the general Lucas critique  of policy 
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variations  in the investment tax credit] are appealing  because of their 
presumably  enlarged  multiplier  impact, with substitution  effects rein- 
forcing the normal income effects of a tax rate change; the required 
dollar  change  in  the instrument  settings  for  any  given  stimulus  or  restraint 
is thereby made smaller. But the anticipatory  effects of such practices 
are destabilizing-for  example, a slowdown in investment outlays is 
exacerbated  if a weakening  of the economy makes a temporary  rise in 
the tax credit  seem likely. A commitment  to retroactivity  can ameliorate 
the problem for tax reduction, but, for a tax rise, retroactivity is 
universally  rejected  as inequitable."1 
This problem cannot enter Taylor's model because fluctuations  in 
investment  are assumed to have no impact  on GDP. The model of the 
business cycle he uses is really very simple and rational  expectations 
consistency is easy to obtain. There is no interaction  in which private 
decisions  are  affected  by the policy rule  but  also affect  the GDP  outcome 
and hence the policy choice in the next period. Taylor does show that 
assuming  a second-order  process  for  GDP  does not  change  his conclusion 
that  the Swedish  system is always stabilizing,  provided  the second-order 
process itself is stable. But that misses the point, because the question 
is whether a Swedish-style program  applied  to all forms of investment 
could cause instability  in a model in which volatility of investment  is a 
major cause of cyclical movements in GDP. There is the fear that if 
businesses anticipate  a recession  they will cut back  investment  and  fulfill 
their own prophecy. By strengthening  this tendency, an investment 
stabilization  program  could conceivably  backfire. 
The data Taylor presents seem to say, however, that Okun was 
worrying  unnecessarily. No unstable movements are apparent  in the 
annual  data and, in any case, the amount of manufacturing  structures 
investment  simply is not enough to feed back into GDP in an important 
way. For the econometric  purpose  at hand,  Taylor  was probably  correct 
to treat  GDP  as exogenous. This was a sound  analysis  of what  looks like 
a sound  policy regime. 
Stanley Fischer: John Taylor's paper is a pleasure to read; it is clear, 
brief, and neat. And it reaches a surprising  conclusion: somewhere, 
sometime,  a government  policy worked  in a way it was intended  to. 
1.  Arthur M. Okun,  "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism:  Some  Analytical  Issues,"  BPEA, 
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Let me start  by describing  what the paper  does not do, then discuss 
what it does. One way to proceed might  have been to look at figure 1, 
which shows the cost of investment goods moving countercyclically, 
and  to try  to develop measures  of the cost of capital,  and  then  the effects 
of the scheme. Taylor does not choose this route, thereby avoiding 
having  to estimate the effects of the cost of capital on investment and 
the embarrassment  of explaining  the major  role of expectations  of future 
demand in investment equations. Rather, he proceeds directly to an 
accelerator-type  model of investment,  in which  the effects of changes  in 
the cost of capital  are implicit  in changes  in the dynamics  of investment. 
This has the benefit of permitting  the funds release scheme to have 
worked  through  availability  rather  than  explicit price. 
The paper  focuses mostly on stabilization  of investment rather  than 
stabilization  of GNP. If GNP fluctuations are mainly the results of 
investment  fluctuations,  this comes to much the same thing. But since 
GNP is modeled  as a first-order  autoregressive  process, and  investment 
as potentially second order, it is possible that the rest of GNP also 
contributes  independent  dynamics  to the economy. In that  case it would 
have been preferable  to use a simple  model of noninvestment  aggregate 
demand  rather  than  GNP to study  the effects of the funds  release scheme 
on economic activity. 
Let me briefly  reinforce  the message contained  in the last part  of the 
paper. This paper does not attempt standard  microeconomic  welfare 
evaluation  of the investment  funds  scheme. There  is indeed  some tension 
between the type of macro stabilization  analysis of this paper and that 
approach  to stabilization.  There one would have started  by asking  why 
there  was any need to interfere  in the first  place. Answering  this question 
takes one into the details of the Swedish capital market  at the time, a 
market  that by all accounts used credit rationing  as its major  allocative 
mechanism. 
In this paper  Taylor's concern is not so much the desirability  of the 
scheme, but its effects. He is faced with the problem  raised  in the classic 
policy evaluation  critique  of Kareken  and  Solow.  1 They pointed  out that 
a series that has been successfully stabilized  will look random  and not 
bear any econometrically detectable relation to the variable used to 
1.  See  Robert M. Solow  and John Kareken,  "Lags  in Monetary Policy,"  part 1 of 
"Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy,"  by Albert Ando and others, in the Commission on 
Money and Credit, Stabilization Policies  (Prentice-Hall,  1963), pp. 14-96. 104  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
stabilize  it. To detect the effects of the policy instrument,  one has to go 
beyond reduced  forms. Taylor  does that  by building  a structural  invest- 
ment  model. I want to raise a few questions  about  the model. 
The first is whether the potential destabilizing  effects of the funds 
scheme have been assumed away. The concern about potential desta- 
bilization  is a real one, which has been raised in the United States in 
connection with the proposal  that the investment  tax credit be used as 
an automatic  stabilizer.  There are several features that might  make the 
funds  release scheme destabilizing  in practice, though  not in the model. 
In the paper  Taylor shows how the scheme could be destabilizing  if 
output  followed something  other than a first-order  autoregressive  pro- 
cess. Under  the assumed  process, it is never  possible to forecast  that  the 
scheme will be implemented  next period if it is not already in effect. 
There  is thus never any danger  that  firms  hold off investment  this period 
in anticipation  of the scheme coming into effect next period. Once the 
process is made second order, that possibility arises, as Taylor shows. 
Of course, well designed  policy can prevent  the destabilization. 
The use of annual  data  may  be partly  responsible  for the data  showing 
only first-order  autoregression. If the process is of second or higher 
order, two more features not treated  in the model create further  desta- 
bilization  potential.  First, the scheme is modeled  as continuous,  though 
it was in fact on and  off. Taylor's suggestion,  that  uncertainty  about  the 
implementation  of the scheme  makes  it appropriate  to use the continuous 
model, is appealing,  but he also gives indications  that there  was about  a 
six-month  warning  of the change  on occasion. Second, the model treats 
investment  and disinvestment  symmetrically.  Investment  can as easily 
be negative as positive in the model of this paper. Given that, there is 
less  worry about committing oneself too  soon.  If disinvestment is 
difficult,  the firm  is more anxious  to choose exactly the right  moment  to 
invest. This introduces  another  potentially  destabilizing  element. 
These considerations suggest caution in interpreting  the apparent 
success of the Swedish scheme as carrying over directly to similar 
success for the implementation  of countercyclical operation of the 
investment  tax credit. 
A second general  modeling  question  concerns the distribution  of the 
investment  projects  by maturity.  As the model is set up, firms  undertake 
the three different  types of investment project (one-, two-, and three- 
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investment undertaken. For instance, one- and two-year investment 
projects may be substitutes in building  a given type of capital. Then a 
temporary  funds release would lead the firm to switch to one-year 
projects. Such a mechanism  is not present in the paper. If it were, the 
effects of the scheme would be stronger. 
The switch in maturity  structure  described  above is not the same as 
the shift toward shorter-term  projects in recessions described in the 
paper.  That switch occurs because the response of one-year  projects  to 
the funds release is larger  than the response of two-year  projects. The 
mechanism  described in the previous paragraph  would strengthen  the 
tendency  to switch to shorter-term  projects  in recessions. 
General Discussion 
Several discussants  wondered  whether  the noncyclical  performance 
of Swedish investment might be attributable  to factors other than the 
investment  funds system. Martin  Baily suggested that Swedish invest- 
ment in manufacturing  structures might be aimed at production for 
foreign  markets.  Consequently,  even in the absence  of the funds  system, 
such investment might not be sensitive to cyclical fluctuations  in the 
Swedish  economy. However, William  Nordhaus  cited OECD  studies of 
European  investment  behavior  that  show  European  investment  typically 
is sensitive to domestic fluctuations,  not to international  fluctuations. 
Nordhaus  pointed  out that one could test whether  the funds systemi  had 
worked  by observing  whether  structures  investment  was damped  relative 
to investment  in equipment. 
Lawrence Summers asked whether the end of the countercyclical 
investment  funds policy coincided with a return  to procyclical  fluctua- 
tions in manufacturing  investment. Taylor reported  that it did, though 
he noted that the variability  of investment  also increased. Christopher 
Sims, while generally  concurring  with the paper's  main  finding,  offered 
a qualification.  The assumption  that the discount factor is constant is 
not innocuous; it implies that real interest rates are treated as fixed, 
whereas  they are probably  cyclical. Furthermore,  interest  rates would 
behave  differently  in the absence of a funds policy. Thus the net impact 
of the policy is probably  smaller  than  that suggested  by the paper. 
Some discussion was devoted to the incentives the funds policy 
created  for intertemporal  substitution  of investment  by firms.  Summers 106  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
noted that the costs of capital  discussed in this paper  are different  from 
Jorgensonian  user costs that economists conventionally think about. 
Those conventional  user costs reflect the expected change in effective 
capital  goods prices, which would be affected by countercyclical  oper- 
ation of the funds system. At the point at which the countercyclical 
policy becomes operative, firms  face drastically  lower costs of capital. 
Consequently,  the user cost of capital  just before the funds are made 
available  reflects the anticipated  future reduction  in the cost of capital 
and  becomes quite  high. Summers  observed  that  Taylor's  results  do not 
show particularly  large  responsiveness  to the cost of capital;  they show 
responses because there are unusually large changes in the cost of 
capital. Finally, he noted a similarity  between the Swedish counter- 
cyclical  funds  policy and  U.S. policies that  provided  accelerated  federal 
funding  for state and local public works projects during  a recession. 
Since the funds were provided  on a matching  grant  basis in the United 
States, local  governments  had  an  incentive  to delay  public  works  projects 
when a recession was anticipated  in order to qualify  for the expected 
federal subsidy. From a macroeconomic perspective, this incentive 
could have occurred  at the wrong  time and  thus could have exacerbated 
the recession. 